Abstract. The Algebraic Eraser (AE) is a public key protocol for sharing information over an insecure channel using commutative and noncommutative groups; a concrete realization is given by Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP). In this paper, we describe how to choose data in CBKAP to thwart an attack by Kalka-Teicher-Tsaban.
Introduction
The Algebraic Eraser (AE), due to Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld-Lemieux [1] , is a public key protocol for sharing information over an insecure channel using commutative and noncommutative groups. The Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP) is a concrete realization of the AE based on the braid group and finite general linear groups. The AE and CBKAP have been proposed as a public key protocol suitable for use in low-resource environments, such as passive RFID systems and remote-sensing networks.
In [4] Kalka-Teicher-Tsaban describe an attack on CBKAP based on probabilistic group theory that tries to recover part of the private data in CBKAP. This data consists of two matrices n a , n b in a large finite general linear group. Kalka-Teicher-Tsaban explain-under the assumption that n a and n b are chosen according to a certain probability distribution-how to detect nontrivial relations that n a , n b must satisfy. This then limits the spaces in which n a , n b live so that searching for them is feasible.
In this short note, we explain a simple technique for choosing n a , n b that defeats this attack.
• G is a group, with identity element e.
• M, N are two monoids. The monoid M has a left G-action denoted by (g, m) → g m. We denote the operation in M by a dot: ·. We denote the semidirect product of M and G by M ⋊ G, and write the binary operation using •:
we put
We denote E-multiplication by a star:
Here by Ecommuting we mean
Now we describe how this data is used to form the AE Key Agreement Protocol. The submonoids A, N A are assigned to Alice, while B, N B are assigned to Bob. Alice chooses private keys
and then builds the public key
Similarly, Bob chooses private keys
and the public key
Given this data, Alice and Bob can then each compute one side of the following equation, which constitutes the shared secret of the protocol:
We note that, in practice, all data in the protocol would be assigned to Alice and Bob by a trusted third party (TTP).
We now describe the Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol, an explicit instance of the AE. Choose n ≥ 8 even and let t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) be a tuple of variables. Define matrices x i (t) by
, and for i = 2, . . . , n − 1 by
Fix a finite field F. The matrices x i (t) generate a subgroup M ⊂ GL(n, F(t 1 , . . . , t n−1 )).
Let G = S n , the symmetric group on n letters, act on the t i by permutations, and let s i ∈ S n be the simple transposition (i, i + 1). Then the pairs {(x i (t), s i )} then generate the semidirect product M ⋊ S n inside GL(n, F(t 1 , . . . , t n−1 )) ⋊ S n . Let N = GL(n, F) and choose n − 1 nonzero
To complete the description of CBKAP, we only need to specify the commuting monoids A, B ⊂ M and the E-commuting monoids N A , N B ⊂ N . For the former, we can take A (respectively, B) to be the subgroup generated by the first (resp., last) (n − 2)/2 matrices x i (t). For the latter, we can fix a matrix m ∈ N and then define N A = N B = F[m], where the latter means all polynomials in m with coefficients in F that lie in N . How one chooses m will be explained below in §4.
The Kalka-Teicher-Tsaban Attack
In [KTT] a practical linear algebraic attack on the AE is developed. The attacker (called Eve) attempts to find Bob's first private key n b ∈ N B . The attack goes as follows. To attack the AE key agreement protocol, Eve creates a spurious element (α, e) ∈ A ⊂ M ⋊ G. Then (α, e) E-commutes with every element in B. In particular it Ecommutes with (β, g) :
, given by taking the semidirect product of Bob's second private keys. It follows that
and, therefore,
Now Eve also knows Bob's public key given by
Combining (1) and (2) Eve obtains
which may be rewritten as
then assume that N is a subgroup of GL(n, F) for some positive integer n and some finite field F, as is done in CBKAP. With this assumption, and the assumption that it is possible to generate many spurious elements (α, e) ∈ A ⊂ M ⋊ G, the authors show that it may be possible for Eve to find n b by linear algebra: Eve uses the (α, e) to generate many equations of the form 2, 3 , . . . . With many such equations she can then try to solve for n b .
Defeating the Kalka-Teicher-Tsaban Attack
We now describe how the TTP can choose data so that Alice and Bob can thwart Eve's attack. The key is to take more care in choosing the matrix m ∈ GL(n, F) that is used to construct the monoids N A , N B .
First, the TTP chooses E-commuting submonoids A, B by giving a set of generators for each of these monoids.
Next, the TTP chooses an element (β, 1) out of the generators of B, chooses constants c ℓ ∈ F, and defines a matrix
This matrix m is made public. Then the TTP defines N A = N B = F[m] to be the set of all polynomials in m with coefficients in F. These two submonoids clearly commute with each other. Alice and Bob then choose first private keys n a , n b by choosing polynomials in the matrix m.
We claim that this defeats the attack. Indeed, suppose Bob chooses n b = ℓ ν ℓ m ℓ with ν ℓ ∈ F. This n b will be a solution to all the equations of the form (3) and (4) that Eve can generate. But this does not give much information about n b , since it is clear that any matrix of the form
will also be a solution to (3) and (4) for any choice of w ℓ ∈ F. In general this is such a large collection of matrices that the equations (3) and (4) give no useful information. Thus Eve cannot feasibly recover Bob's first private key via this attack.
Remark. There is a variant protocol that deserves mention, in which the TTP chooses commuting monoids A, B and gives B to Bob and only makes A public. Thus B is kept secret and is only known to Bob. The TTP also creates the matrix m out of a spurious element (β, 1) in B as above, and makes m public. Using A and the matrix m, Alice can do a key exchange with Bob. This protocol is what is used in potential RFID applications, cf. [3, §1.4] and [2] .
